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ARTICLES
THE JUDICIARY IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS:
THE CRITICAL ROLE OF U.S.




This paper proposes a theory that explains how
political transitions deal with incumbent judiciaries. We argue
that a new political regime compares the benefit of reshaping
the judiciary with loyal appointees against the political and
economic costs of directly interfering, including the cost of
international reputation. There are several forms of
interventionism including court packing, court purging, and
violence against the judiciary. We discuss political transitions
in Europe and Latin American civil law jurisdictions through
the lens of our theory. We argue that American constitutional
influence plays a critical role. In addition, we provide a
detailed analysis of the recent case of Venezuela, a process
that began in 1999. The Venezuelan case verifies two
conditions identified by our model: weaker forms of formalism
and an institution's lack of prestige, and, in particular, the
justices of the Supreme Court of Justice. These factors explain
the strategic choices of Venezuela's current President, Hugo
Chdvez.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 20, 2009, President elect Barack Obama, in
compliance with Article II, Section I of the U.S. Constitution,'
We thank Diego Werneck Arguelhes, Carlos Delvasto, Adriana Garcia, Tom
Ginsburg, Carlos G6mez Liguerre, Antonio Hespanha, David Law, Tatiana Maranhao,
Rodolfo Noronha, Maria Angela Oliveira, Cesar Santolim, Eduardo Stordeur, the late
Luis Schuartz, and FGV seminar participants for their helpful comments. Excellent
research assistance was provided by Carlos Bacalao-Fleury, Isabel Freitas Peres, Diego
Saul, and Caroline Belloff.
* Professor of Law and H. Ross & Helen Workman Research Scholar, University of
Illinois College of Law. B.A. (Econ, Universidade Nova de Lisboa), M.Sc. (Econ,
University of London), Ph.D. (Econ, University of York), L.L.M. (University of London).
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swore "to the best of [his] ability, preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States." The world witnessed Obama
and U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts stumble over
each other's words during the inauguration ceremony. Although a
seemingly insignificant error (i.e., the word "faithfully" was put in
the wrong place) Chief Justice Roberts re-administered the oath
the following day to comply with the exact language of Article II,
Section I of the U.S. Constitution.
Democracy presupposes respect for the rule of law and its
formalism. It therefore requires a legal and institutional order
where law prevails over the will of the rulers and there is judicial
review of the constitutionality and legality of the acts of public
power.2 This statement was acknowledged by the International
American States (IAS) when it adopted the Inter-American
Democratic Charter in 2001 and stated that the "[e]ssential
elements of representative democracy" to include "access to and
the exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law" and "the
separation of powers and independence of the branches of
government."
3
Democracy requires an independent judiciary even if, as is the
case in Venezuela, the rule of law is weak.4 Indeed, a minimal
definition of the rule of law might not mean an actual separation
of power or submission to the laws, but simply a respect and
guarantee of constitutional rights.5
However, as announced by President Chivez, when a new
government embodies a political and legal transition from an old
** L.L.B. (Universidad Catolica Andr6s Bello, Caracas, Venezuela), Advanced Studies
in Corporate Law (Universidad Metropolitana, Venezuela), L.L.M. (University of
Illinois), J.D. (University of Illinois).
1 Each president recites the following oath from the U.S. Constitution, "I do solemnly
swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States,
and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the
United States." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
2 For a comprehensive discussion, see generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE
RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004). See
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989);
Michael Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, 74
S. CAL. L. REV. 1307 (2001).
3 Inter-American Democratic Charter art. 3, Sept. 11, 2011, 40 I.L.M. 1289, available
at http://www.oas.orglcharter/docs/resolutionl-enp4.htm.
4 Rogelio P6rez-Perdomo, Venezuela 1958-1999: The Legal System in an Impaired
Democracy, in LEGAL CULTURE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: LATIN AMERICA
AND LATIN EUROPE 423 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Rogelio P6rez-Perdomo eds., 2003)
[hereinafter Venezuela 1958-1999].
5 Id.
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to a new constitutional arrangement, the meaning of the rule of
law and the independent judiciary becomes more controversial.
The significance of a rule of law and an independent judiciary is
particularly contentious in the context of a political transition from
a dictatorial regime to a new democratic arrangement. On one
hand, the establishment of a rule of law as a separation of powers
and submission to the laws necessarily precludes any interference
with the judiciary. On the other hand, the judiciary has largely
been appointed, influenced, and dominated by the previous
political regime, and has therefore been suspected of potentially
undermining the foundations of the new democratic regime. The
respect for the rule of law and the proper adherence of the
judiciary to the new political regime create a conceptual and
practical problem.
It may be argued that there is an asymmetric
conceptualization of the rule of law.6 When a political regime goes
from authoritarian to democratic, the replacement of the judiciary
appointed by the dictatorship is not inevitably inconsistent with
the judiciary's independence. This argument purports that the
former judiciary would likely undermine democracy and
consequently limit the rule of law itself. The use of impeachment,
forced resignation, court packing, or the creation of new courts to
undermine the incumbent judiciary is acceptable under the cover
of constitutional change that embodies a shift to democracy.7 For
example, new constitutional courts can be regarded as transitional
devices to constrain and undercut the influence of the judges
appointed by the previous authoritarian regime.8 However, when
a political regime transitions from democracy to authoritarianism,
or in the case of a consolidated democracy, replacement of the
judiciary is inescapably inconsistent and unacceptable under the
rule of law. The judiciary cannot be replaced because judges
promote rule of law and democratic legal principles. From a legal
theory perspective, while such asymmetric conceptualization offers
a safe means for political transition, it does not address the
practical problems that transitioning governments encounter.
A new political regime cannot easily trust a judiciary selected
6 See Owen M. Fiss, The Right Degree of Independence, in TRANSITION TO
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and influenced by a previous regime that is by and large faithful to
a different ideology and embodies a distinct political and legal
culture. The extent to which that judiciary will engage in active
judicial review to promote a separate political and legal agenda
might be a serious concern for the new regime. This behavior
might undermine new constitutional and political arrangements
and may also question, or even damage, the political and social
legitimacy of the new regime.
In the alternative, replacing the judiciary may pose serious
problems and burden the new regime with significant costs.
Administrative costs are accrued when finding and training a new
group of judges to reside on the courts. The more extensive the
court repopulation becomes, the higher the administrative costs.
To economize on these costs a government could replace judges
only on the highest courts. Nevertheless, this solution has the
potential to entrust vast areas of the court system in the hands of
the younger judges appointed by the previous regime who may
then be able to dominate the higher courts in later years as they
are promoted or selected. Therefore, while repopulating all of the
courts is expensive, it promises to be more effective than only
replacing the highest ranking judges.
Yet the administrative costs are not always the most relevant
costs. Political costs are also considerable and important. In
negotiated transitions from military dictatorships to democracy,
such as those in Chile and Argentina in the 1990s, keeping the
former judiciary and exercising deference to the higher courts may
be a component of the arrangement. 9 The government that
relinquishes power to a new political regime might feel that the
new regime's adoption of the old judiciary is a means of protecting
the relinquishing regime's interests and could therefore be more
willing to peacefully accept transition. Consequently, the new
political regime might receive a stable and ordered transition at
the expense of accepting the old judiciary.
A second important political cost includes losses in terms of
international reputation and foreign economic investment. The
replacement of the judiciary may damage the international
standing of the new political regime. For example, a new
authoritarian regime might want to sustain the fiction of
institutional continuity or judicial independence. A new
democratic regime may be in a weaker position to shape the
9 See infra Part IV.
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judiciary once constitutional rights and protection have been
granted. Foreign investment is also a significant variable; investors
might suspect the new political regime will weaken established
property rights and therefore reduce the expected return on
investment. The replacement of the judiciary can be (correctly or
incorrectly) perceived as the first step in that direction. Foreign
and national investors usually prefer legal and judicial stability and
are usually dissuaded if the new political regime interferes
radically and extensively with the old judiciary.
Most of the literature on political transitions and the judiciary
tends to concentrate on the treatment of an incumbent judiciary
appointed and patronized by a dictatorship in an emerging
democracy. This focus is explained by the recent transitions in
Europe, Asia, and Latin America, and can also presumably be
explained by the adherence of a democracy to the principle rule of
law, which makes direct interventionism with an incumbent
judiciary a conceptual legal problem. It is generally believed that a
new nondemocratic regime would be less concerned with rule of
law and would consequently interfere more directly with the
incumbent judiciary. However, this observation is historically
inaccurate. An authoritarian regime might not be willing to
openly interfere with the judiciary for several political reasons. 10
A new authoritarian regime can avoid an open challenge to
the judiciary by legitimizing the regime itself, allowing the courts
to establish social control and regulation aligned with the interests
of the regime, and thus alleviating potential political tensions. In
fact, empowering the judiciary to some extent could extend the life
of the regime and avoid an abrupt loss of power.'
At the same time, by providing legitimacy and social
regulation the courts economize on other more aggressive and
expensive sources of power. It also establishes a credible
commitment to economic policy, in particular toward foreign and
domestic investment. They might even be called to decide on
controversial reforms. 2  In addition, it is important for the
judiciary to retain some degree of independence to maintain
cohesion within the ruling coalition and to mitigate severe
10 See Tamir Moustafa & Tom Ginsburg, Introduction: The Functions of Courts in
Authoritarian Politics, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN
REGIMES 1-10 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008).
11 Id. at 5-7.
12 Id. at 1-10 (discussing Egypt as an example of when a Supreme Constitutional Court
was called to review a reformist package of economic liberalization in the 1980s).
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fragmentation of the authoritarian ruling elite. 13
In most jurisdictions, the incumbent judiciary is subject to
political and legal concerns that determine its potential
replacement or maintenance. The transition from the thirteen
British colonies to the United States dealt with British judges
appointed by the monarch to serve in the colonies where they held
office at pleasure since the 1701 Act of Settlement, which
guaranteed the independence of the judiciary would not run. 4
The solution to replacing the British judges that the new American
states did not trust is at the heart of many features developed in
the United States concerning judicial appointment, selection, and
retention at the state level. This also definitely influenced the
design of the judiciary at the federal level. Throughout the
nineteenth century, as new states that joined the United States
were formally under Spanish, French, or Mexican rule, similar
problems with incumbent judges had to be addressed. Another
important episode was the establishment of a separate court
system by the Confederacy in 1861, and how the United States
treated the pro-slavery judiciary of the South after its defeat in
1865. Recent evidence may suggest that the way a state chooses to
address the nature of judicial independence, as designed by the
previous colonial powers, explains substantive differences
concerning legal and economic performance across states today. 15
In Europe, the political transitions of the twentieth century
also evidence creative ways of addressing the incumbent judiciary.
Some examples of such include: Germany and Italy after WWII;
Portugal, Spain and Greece at the end of their authoritarian
regimes in the late 1970s; and the former communist Central and
Eastern European countries in the 1990s. 16 The Argentina and
13 Id. at 8 (explaining the establishment of the Constitutional Court in Chile in 1981
under Pinochet).
14 See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Abdicating and Limiting Parliament's Sovereignty, 17
KING'S C. L. J. 255 (2006). See generally CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS
AND CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA'S JUDICIAL
SYSTEM (Univ. of Michigan Press 2008) (discussing the concerns of the Constitutional
Convention about judicial independence and the disposition that judges serve at pleasure
of the monarch).
15 Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay, American Civil Law Origins: Implications for State
Constitutions and State Courts, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 62 (2005); Daniel Berkowitz &
Karen Clay, The Effect of Judicial Independence on Courts: Evidence from American
States, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (2006).
16 See discussion infra Part IV. The separation of Slovakia from the Czech Republic is
another interesting example. When Czechoslovakia split in 1993 the Supreme Court of
the Czechoslovak Federal Republic lapsed (this court functioned only for about ten
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Chile regime transitions from military to democratic in the early
1990s have more recently become the focus of much debate.
Judicial reform in Latin America is constrained by the needs to
address the role of the judiciary and their difficult past in terms of
democratic legitimacy. 17
Unlike the United States, Europe and Latin America have a
common civil law tradition. Although subject to debate,
comparative law usually includes the Latin American countries in
the French civil law family, because of Portuguese and Spanish
colonial influence, whereas the German civil law stands as a
separate and distant relative.' 8
In this paper we focus on political transitions in Europe and
Latin America. Although they share a civil law tradition, we
identify different manners of addressing the judiciary during
political transitions. We argue that there are substantive
explanations as to why Latin American political transitions are,
generally speaking, more interventionist than in Europe. These
reasons reflect the mix of civil law tradition with American
constitutional influence. This mix, which is relatively unknown to
Europe, results in a particular judicial institution design that
attracts more interventionism by political authorities of a new
regime.
At this point in the paper it is important to note that readers
should exercise care when evaluating the generalizations we
discuss. The characteristics and political transitions of Latin
American countries vary historically. Part II provides a general
view that clarifies the main distinctions explained by our model
and considers important exceptions that should be taken into
account when discussing particular cases. Part IV is an overview
of Europe and Latin American political transitions that provides
more detailed analysis. Our aim is to account for these transitions
from the perspective of our generalized theory which necessarily
leaves many local particular details without explanation. At the
same time our theory does not exhaust the possibility of other
months in 1992) as did the terms of the justices of the federal court. There was no
automatic continuing of their duties into the new Czech and Slovakian Supreme Court
systems. Of the justices who were nominated for the new Slovak Supreme Court in 1993,
none had functioned as a justice in the Czechoslovak Federal Supreme Court. We thank
Katka Svatikova for this information.
17 See discussion infra Part IIl.
18 See generally K. Zweigert & H. Kotz, AN INTRODUcTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW
(T. Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998).
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contributing local factors that may explain why each transition is
unique in certain particular aspects.
Judicial reform and change in Latin America has been
explained by essentially three models.' 9 One model views judicial
reform as an "insurance policy" through which the authorities
develop the legal framework for a more independent judiciary
when an incumbent government encounters the possibility of
losing power. A more independent judiciary will serve as a
guarantor of the current status quo and prevent the new
authorities from dismantling present arrangements, or at least slow
down the pace of change."2 This model does not explain why a
new political regime, in its early stages when the potential for
losing power is in the distant future, should be deterred from
interfering with the judiciary imposed by the previous political
regime.
A second model views judicial change leading to more
independence and autonomy as the inevitable result of party
competition in situations where no political group exercises full
control of the executive and legislative branches. This model,
inspired by the U.S., proposes a divided government as the main
explanation for judicial independence.21 Our paper analyzes the
opposing perspective, specifically how interferences with the
judiciary prevail in both autocratic and democratic regimes. The
different way autocratic regimes deal with the incumbent judiciary
may support the idea that divided government does not fully
explain judicial independence.
A third model proposes legitimacy as the main explanation
for how Latin American governments deal with the judiciary.
Unlike the previous models that require some degree of political
competition, this literature sees legitimacy as the outcome of self-
imposed restrictions put in place to achieve more credibility.
Judicial reforms are therefore instrumental in helping the
executive and legislative branches building up leverage for future
19 See Diana Kapiszewski & Matthew M. Taylor, Doing Courts Justice? Studying
Judicial Politics in Latin America, 6 PERSP. IN POL. 741 (2008).
20 See Jodi Finkel, Judicial Reform in Argentina in the 1990s: How Electoral Incentives
Shape Institutional Change, 39 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 56 (2004); Jodi Finkel, Judicial
Reform as Insurance Policy: Mexico in the 1990s, 47 LATIN AM. POL. & Soc'Y 87 (2005).
21 See Rebecca Bill ChAvez, The Construction of the Rule of Law in Argentina: A Tale
of Two Provinces, 35 COMP. POL. 417 (2003); Rebecca Bill ChAvez, The Evolution of
Judicial Autonomy in Argentina: Establishing the Rule of Law in an Ultrapresidential
System, 36 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 451 (2004).
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purposes. 22  We recognize legitimacy and credibility as an
important part of the problem. However, we provide a detailed
account of costs and benefits, where legitimacy is only one of the
relevant variables.
Part III details the heart of our theory. We explain why the
balance of costs and benefits for a political regime in transition
differ within civil law countries. In particular we explain why
active interventionism is more likely in Latin American countries
than in Europe. Part IV discusses the specific political transitions
in Europe and Latin America in light of our generalized model.
In Part V we make a detailed application to the case of
Venezuela with a particular focus on the relationship between the
current government with President Chdivez who has promoted a
significant transition in the Venezuelan political regime and the
incumbent judiciary. In our view, Venezuela is a striking example
of a political transition from a fairly stable democracy to a more
authoritarian regime. President Chdivez' new government has
challenged the Venezuelan judiciary while simultaneously
promoting more effective courts and new rules for the purpose of
enhancing judicial independence. We argue that our theory
explains the policy set by President Chdivez since his inauguration
in 1999.
Part VI concludes the discussion of our new theory of political
transitions in Europe and Latin America based on a comparison of
the benefit of reshaping the judiciary, therefore interfering with
the incumbent judiciary in different forms, with the costs of
undermining rule of law. We argue that this cost-benefit analysis
captures the essential differences of political transitions in civil law
jurisdictions in Europe and Latin America.23
22 See, e.g., Daniel Brinks, Judicial Reform and Independence in Brazil and Argentina:
The Beginning of the New Millennium? 40 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 595 (2005); Alba M. Ruibal,
Self-Restraint in Search of Legitimacy: The Reform of the Argentine Supreme Court, 51
LATIN AM. POL. & SOC'Y 59 (2009).
23 For an analysis of Asia, see generally TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW
DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES (Cambridge Univ. Press
2003). For example, in the Philippines after the People Power revolution in 1986,
President Corazon Aquino accepted the resignation of all Supreme Court justices and
reconstituted it according to the new 1987 Constitution. Given the important American
constitutional influence in the Philippines, the observed pattern of judicial transition
supports our model. See Stacia Haynie, Paradise Lost: Politicization of the Philippine
Supreme Court in the Post Marcos Era, 22 ASIAN STUD. REV. 459 (1998); Dante
Gatmaytan-Magno, Changing Constitutions: Judicial Review and Redemption in the
Philippines, 25 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1 (2007).
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II. INCUMBENT JUDICIARIES IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS
Any political regime in its transition stage must address the
incumbent judiciary. As argued earlier, the degree to which the
new ruling elite distrust the judiciary appointed by the former
regime will influence their degree of interference. Political
interventionism can take different shapes. There are soft
approaches that indicate the judiciary's need to adhere to the new
regime, or at least to limit confrontation with the political
arrangements. There are also hard approaches when the new
ruling elite find the incumbent judiciary too unreliable, which
therefore justifies a riskier and more direct confrontation. The
following is a detailed discussion of these different possibilities.
A. Take Advantage of Limited Tenure and Other Laws
When the incumbent judiciary has limited tenure, in particular
designed to loosely coincide with changes in the political cycle of
government in office or presidential inaugurations, the new regime
may secure this advantage by slowly replacing the incumbents.
The enormous advantage of this option is that, in principle, there is
no constitutional crisis or obvious loss of rule of law. However, an
important disadvantage is that it may take a while before the new
regime is able to replace a significant part of the judiciary.
Another similar route is to use impeachment or removal
procedures already established in the law. This way the new
regime might be able to hide political motivations under other
technical reasons for impeachment such as financial corruption or
gross misbehavior, including failure to comply with judicial duties.
When applying legal principles developed by the previous regime
rule of law is not lost. The significant disadvantage is that it might
not be easy to frame technically and provide strong evidence to
justify the impeachment or the removal. There is a fine line
between impeachment according to the law and straight court
purging. 24
This option has been used in Latin American countries when
there is no regime transition but a mere change of president or
party in office. In addition, this option was utilized in Argentina
and Chile during their transitions from military regimes to
democracy in the mid 1980s and early 1990s respectively,
24 See GEYH, supra note 14, at 113.
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presumably to achieve a peaceful process without upsetting the
supporters of the old regime.1
5
A different case, but nevertheless relevant in this context, is
that the judiciary abandons the country after the change of
political regime. Hence, an incumbent judiciary does not directly
face the new regime because it has voluntarily, or in anticipation of
reprisals, abandoned the country. This was apparently the
situation in Cuba in 1959, after the collapse of the Fulgencio
Batista's dictatorship (1952-1959) and the implementation of the
new regime under the leadership of Fidel Castro. It is said that
many upper-middle class judges preferred to fly abroad to exile
rather than wait for the transition. The new Cuban dictator could
easily establish a new loyal Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo
Popular) in the legal vacuum created by the sudden departure of
the previous Justices.26
B. Further Codification and New Laws
Another potential soft way to constrain the incumbent
judiciary is by recodification, or the enactment of new laws that
actively restrain the judges from interfering with the new regime.
Promoting formalism, clarifying ambiguous statutes or openly
legislating against incumbent legal doctrines could provide the
necessary framework to avoid confrontation with the judiciary.27
For example, the democratic transitions in Italy and Portugal
inherited fascist civil codes. 28 They neither replaced the judges nor
revoked the entire civil code, but rather amended where necessary
to indicate to the incumbent judiciary the new interpretation
according to the new political regime or where the old civil code
directly interfered with new social policies (e.g., family law).
25 See Fiss, supra note 6; WILLIAM C. PRILLAMAN, THE JUDICIARY AND
DEMOCRATIC DECAY IN LATIN AMERICA (Praeger Paperback 2000).
26 Information gathered by the authors in direct conversation with Cuban legal
scholars.
27 In fact, this might have been one of the original goals of codification by Napoleon,
an effective and successful technique to constraint the unreliable French judiciary largely
suspected of supporting the Ancien Rggime. See Benito Arrufiada & Veneta Andonova,
Judges' Cognition and Market Order, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 665 (2008); Benito Arrufiada &
Veneta Andonova, Common Law and Civil Law as Pro-Market Adaptations, 26 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'Y 81 (2008).
28 E.g., Italy (1942) and Portugal (1966).
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C. Promote Internal Politicization from the Top
In a highly hierarchical judicial system, where the Supreme
Court exerts overwhelming influence in selection, promotion and
retention, an available option is to use it to the advantage of the
new regime. The Supreme Court will be in a good position to
shape the judiciary throughout the political transition by
promoting an ideology adherent to the new regime, promoting and
favoring loyal judges, and punishing or disciplining disloyal judges.
When the design of the Supreme Court's powerful influence is
actually inherited from the former political regime, this option
avoids the reputation of excessive interventionism.
An alternative framework is to develop a new body that, for
the sake of improving the functioning of the judiciary, will in fact
mentor the selection and promotion of the judiciary. Taking the
form of a judicial council, this new body will have the duty to
ensure the incumbent judiciary does not challenge the regime very
often. Composed by judges, lawyers and politicians, the judicial
council will be in a strong position to regulate the behavior of the
incumbent judiciary and develop the necessary professional norms
to avoid serious clashes.
This was the solution favored by Portugal, Spain, France and
Italy in their political transitions. 9  The judicial council was
designed to help the independence of the judiciary under a
doctrine of self-government (as opposed to the tradition of being
dominated by a strong executive). However, the same judicial
council was successful in reshaping the judiciary in terms of
professional values and diffusing political influence. The case of
the Brazilian judicial council established by the military
dictatorship after 1964 provides an example where that same
institution was used to discipline the judiciary.3"
D. Promotion
The fourth soft strategy is to promote disloyal judges,
particularly in the highest courts, to high profile jobs and other
lucrative positions with less political influence outside of the
29 See Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and
Judicial Independence, 57 AM. J COMP. L. 103 (2009); Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg,
The Comparative Law and Economics of Judicial Councils, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 52
(2009).
30 See discussion infra Part IV.
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judiciary. This may effectively promotes a buy-out for the
incumbent judiciary. However, this strategy inevitably requires
the incumbent judiciary's cooperation since the acceptance of such
promotions results from a passive or active acquiescence of
ideological defeat. Apparently President Menem was an




If unsatisfied with the incumbent judiciary, particularly the
highest judicial bodies, another possibility is to institute court
packing. The goal is to have a loyal majority in the relevant courts
and reduce the influence of the disloyal incumbent judiciary. The
disadvantage of court packing is that obvious political goals might
negatively affect the independence of the judiciary.
Not unheard of in the United States (e.g., the court packing
plan of President Roosevelt in 1937),32 this strategy has been
observed in transitions to democracy (e.g., Argentina in the late
1980s), but also in military authoritarian regimes (e.g., Brazil in
1964). 33
F Creation of New Courts
A common strategy implemented by new regimes is to
restructure the court system in to promote the creation of new
special or specialized courts. The approach consists of isolating
the potential problems caused by incumbent judiciary disloyalty.
The political regime identifies the most relevant areas of potential
confrontation and assigns them to a new court system packed by
loyal judges.
In authoritarian regimes political crimes, human rights
violations, police activity regulation, and all acts that potentially
threaten the regime may be allocated to a new system of political
courts that will smoothly implement the wishes and goals of the
regime. Consequently, these political courts are frequently
extinguished after the collapse of the authoritarian regime. In this
respect, the case of Hitler's Germany is paramount.34
31 See Fiss, supra note 6.
32 See GEYH, supra note 14, at 79.
33 See discussion infra Part IV.
34 See discussion infra Part IV.
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In a transition to democracy, standard policy is to create a
new constitutional court packed by judges, law professors, and
lawyers faithful to the new constitutional values. This approach
was implemented in Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Portugal and
most former communist Central and Eastern European countries.
Constitutional review is a fundamental piece of the new political
regime and cannot be trusted to the incumbent judiciary.35 The
same applies to authoritarian regimes, the Chilean Constitutional
Court as the most striking example.
3 6
G. Court Purging
A harder strategy is to dismiss the incumbent judiciary, as
observed in some Latin American countries such as Argentina,
Peru, and Bolivia. The entire replacement of the Supreme Court
or of the constitutional court could effectively secure a loyal
judiciary. The judiciary of the lower courts may also be purged to
secure a completely faithful court system, if necessary. The main
cost of court purging is political in terms of international
reputation. If all the previous approaches can be theorized within
a rule of law paradigm, a doctrine of court purging consistent with
a rule of law has to be extremely creative.
We have exposed the asymmetric conceptualization of a rule
of law.37 It is possible that in a transition to democracy court
purging could be excused to promote democracy and new
constitutional values. Nevertheless, the inevitable political
discretion in court purging could be inconsistent with elementary
constitutional principles, such as separation of powers. This
inconsistency was exemplified in Peru in the mid 1990s.38
H. Sponsoring Violence Against the Judiciary
The most difficult option is to eliminate any threats posed by
35 See John Elster, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 639 (1991); WOJCIECH SADURSKI, RIGHTS BEFORE COURTS: A STUDY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POSTCOMMUNIST STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPE (Springer 2008) (discussing the model of constitutional review in the Baltic
republics, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria in
search of democratic legitimacy and the increasing conflicts with the government as a
result of enhanced judicial activism).
36 See discussion infra Part IV.
37 See Fiss, supra note 6.
38 See discussion infra Part IV.
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the incumbent judiciary through state sponsored violence. It is
rare that such open and violent challenges to the judiciary occur
and this open challenge more often occurs in totalitarian regimes.
It may also arise during political transitions in weak states where
violence is used to intimidate the judiciary to further certain
political interests. An unfortunate example of such is exemplified
in Colombia.
III. A THEORY OF INTERVENTIONISM IN POLITICAL
TRANSITIONS
Political transitions must overcome the obstacle of an
incumbent, potentially disloyal, judiciary that may seek to advance
its own ideological goals that undermine the new regime's political
and constitutional aims. There are different, but not mutually
exclusive, strategies that the new ruling elite can utilize. Harder
strategies, rather than softer, are more effective to minimize or
eliminate judicial disloyalty. But harder strategies are also more
costly in terms of reputation, international ratings, and respect for
rule of law. Softer versions can minimize these costs but they are
evidently less effective. Depending on local determinants, political
context, and even the international geopolitical and economic
interests, the balance might favor one type of strategy over
another.
One relevant dimension is timing. Political transitions that
require quick results might be inclined to pursue harder strategies
more frequently. Political transitions that do not face strong
external challenges and benefit from more time to accomplish
results tend to use softer strategies.
A general overview of political transitions in Europe and
Latin America detects a less common use of harder strategies in
the former rather than in the latter. This observation holds true
both for transitions from authoritarian regimes to democracy as
well as from more democratic regimes to authoritarian
governments. Given the civil law tradition, such significant
differences could be surprising. In this paper we propose two
arguments to justify this disparity.
Our first proposal argues that the incumbent judiciary is
generally less threatening in European jurisdictions. Our second
proposal argues that the political and social costs of openly
challenging the incumbent judiciary are significantly lower in Latin
America. Both arguments purport the same idea: harder
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approaches to the incumbent judiciary are more costly and less
needed in Europe than in Latin American from the perspective of
the new ruling elite, whether democratic or authoritarian.
A. Formalism of the Judiciary and the United States'
Influence
One of the main characteristics of a civil judiciary in terms of
lawmaking is its strong adherence to strict formalism.3 9 There are
good legal reasons for this dependence on strict formalism since
the civil law system was originally conceived as a reaction to an
excessively interventionist judiciary. In addition, there are also
important practical reasons. Formalism, as originally imposed by
civil law, shields the judiciary from political shifts. It undercuts
judicial responsibility for political and social consequences of legal
decisions and transfers all the political legitimacy and
responsibility for the way the legal system regulates society to the
legislator. On one hand, this means the judiciary will enforce
absurd and outrageous laws so long as they are the explicit
manifestation of legislative will. On the other hand, the judiciary
will avoid responsibility for these laws and their unacceptable and
sometimes immoral consequences.
A strict uncritical formalism is reinforced by professional
norms developed by two mechanisms. One mechanism is
bureaucratic in nature and is the process of selection, promotion,
and retention that emphasizes internal loyalties rather than by
ideology or party line. A second far-reaching mechanism is the
existence of a judicial school that favors socialization and judicial
education within a pre-defined set of rules that apply to a close
group. Both mechanisms create an "esprit de corps" matched only
by other state bureaucracies. The legal culture of a bureaucratic
judiciary emphasizes collective goals and reputation while
deemphasizing individualism and personal ideological goals. n'
Formalist and bureaucratic judiciaries pose less of a threat to
political transitions. Although conservative in nature (pro-status
quo) due to the rigidity of professional norms and the "esprit de
corps," these judiciaries will rarely undermine the will of the new
39 See generally John Merryman, How Others do It: The French and the German
Judiciaries, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1865 (1988); Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and
Statutes, 7(0 U. COLO. L. REV. 225 (1998).
40 See generally Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Reputation and Audiences:
Perspectives from Comparative Law, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 451 (2009).
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legislator for the sake of formalism itself. These types of
judiciaries can also be easily manipulated if the interests of the
new regime capture the highest levels of the bureaucracy.
The main problem raised by a formalist judiciary is the
possible interpretation of the laws enacted by the new regime
under the old principles of law that are not formally abrogated or
derogated. This could require more legislative activity by the new
regime to replace these old general principles of law or doctrines,
but it does constitute a major reason for conflict between the
judiciary and the new regime. Once the old principles and
doctrines are replaced, a formalist judiciary will easily
accommodate the preferences of the new regime by faithfully
following the new principles and doctrines.
Therefore, highly formalist and bureaucratic judiciaries offer
little resistance to the new political regime, independent of its
political orientation. Less formalist and less hierarchical
judiciaries are more likely to oppose changes that they disagree
with on ideological grounds thus undermining the enforcement
and application of new laws.
The civil law tradition in Latin America has been developed
on the periphery of the ninetieth and twentieth century evolution
in Spain and Portugal. The tradition of the Spanish and
Portuguese judiciary as a mere interpreter, as opposed to an active
lawmaker, has been well established since colonial times. Spanish
and Portuguese colonies had limited exposure to any kind of self-
government or home rule. Unlike the United States, Latin
America was controlled by authoritarian crowns while struggling
with liberal revolutions in the early nineteenth century when the
colonies gained independence.4
In the case of Spain, the Council of Indies (Real y Supremo
Consejo de Indias) was the highest court and located in Madrid.
The Council of Indies was simultaneously an administrative and
legislative body as well as an appeals court. The local audiencias
were advisory bodies to the viceroy and performed as high courts
in the colonies for civil, criminal, and administrative matters (Real
Audiencia). They were also executive and judicial authorities.
These local audiencias reviewed the acts of royal officers to protect
royal prerogatives, but they were not an independent review board
because their formal role was to support the interests of the
41 Luz Estella Nagle, Evolution of the Colombian Judiciary and the Constitutional
Court, 6 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 59 (1995).
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Spanish crown.42
The situation in the Portuguese colony was not very different.
The administration of justice was a matter for the local governors
assisted by a judicial body (ouvidor-geral da comarca). Higher
courts were established in 1608 (Tribunal da Relaqdo do Estado do
Brasil, in Bahia) and in 1751 (Tribunal da Relaqdo do Rio de
Janeiro for the south, whereas the previous high court had
jurisdiction over the north). These higher courts were chaired by
the governor-general of Brazil to defend the Portuguese crown.
The final court of appeal was the king's court in Lisbon (Casa da
Suplicaqdo de Lisboa). With the transfer of the royal court to Rio
in 1808, the highest court of the kingdom was divided in half, the
king's court in Lisbon had jurisdiction over Portugal and the king's
court in Rio (Casa da Suplicaqio do Rio) had jurisdiction over
Brazil. The latter was the embryo of the Brazilian Supreme Court,
inaugurated in 1829 after Brazil established independence in
1822. 43
The legacy of the colonial rule in Latin American legal
systems has favored a centralized control of government with few
checks and balances as well as a weak judiciary that is traditionally
deferent to the executive branch. In addition, the absence of
precedent in the Spanish and Portuguese legal tradition and the
embryonic stage of a legal doctrine establishing a separation of
powers at the moment of independence are important elements of
the Latin American legal culture.44
The codification and later developments in civil law arrived
after Latin America gained independence. The European
influence, while tempered by local needs, still certainly had a
significant role in later codifications after the 1850s and 1860s.
Civil and commercial codes largely followed the examples of
France and Spain but were subject to local adaptations (from well-
known legal scholars such as Andr6s Bello in Chile, V61ez
Sarsfield in Argentina, and Teixeira de Freitas in Brazil).45
The initial models for the role of the judiciary were
necessarily authoritarian given the Portuguese and Spanish
influence. Thus, a weak and subordinated judiciary had a
42 Id.
43 HISTORIA DA EXPANSAO PORTUGUESA 235 (Francisco Bethencourt & Kirti
Chaudhuri eds., 1998) (Port.).
44 See generally STEPHEN ZAMORA ET AL., MEXICAN LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 2004).
45 See generally ANGEL R. OQUENDO, LATIN AMERICAN LAW (Foundation Press
2006).
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tendency to prevail. The evolution from these initial conditions,
however, was particular to Latin America.
46
We argue that European judiciaries, even before the far-
reaching reforms after WWII, were traditionally more formalist
and bureaucratic than in Latin America. Appointment
mechanisms were always more bureaucratic and less ideological in
Europe, the "esprit de corps" was stronger, and the influence of
judicial schools more powerful.47
Obviously the notion of formalism changes over time, even in
the most traditional legal systems such as France. The slow
introduction of general principles of law as a form to limit
legislation changed the behavior of the European judiciary and a
new form of activism emerged in Europe at the end of the
twentieth century. At most we can discuss some weak
convergences across legal systems.
In our view, the influence of American constitutionalism in
Latin America is the main reason for the difference between
European and Latin American judiciaries. The formalist and
bureaucratic tradition of civil law was diminished by the design
imported from the U.S. Constitution that naturally induces
politicization of the judiciary and, at a later stage, judicial activism.
Since the nineteenth century, judicial activism never played the
same role in Latin America that it did in the U.S., but the political
mechanisms of judicial appointment, coupled with the absence of
strict vertical organization, largely undermined the existence of a
strong "esprit de corps. ' 48 Consequently, the incumbent judiciary
in political transitions would potentially be less loyal to the new
regime, or more openly loyal to the previous political regime, in
Latin America than in Europe. In turn, this characteristic might
convince the new political regime of the need to directly interfere
with the judiciary or more eagerly challenge the established courts.
The heavy influence of American constitutionalism should
also be assessed in perspective. 49  There was a strong initial
46 See Fiss, supra note 6.
47 On the independence of Supreme Courts, see Joel G. Verner, The Independence of
Supreme Courts in Latin America, 16 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 463 (1984).
48 Keith S. Rosenn, The Success of Constitutionalism in the United States and its Failure
in Latin America: An Explanation, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1 (1990) (noting
federalism, division of powers between the branches of government, and checks and
balances to avoid concentration in the Latin American and U.S. legal systems).
49 The impact of American constitutionalism in Latin America has been asymmetric,
with Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela and Mexico being the most influenced countries. See,
e.g., Mitchell Gordon, When Executive/Judicial Balances Diverged in Argentina and the
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borrowing in Venezuela or Mexico, with almost literal copies in
Argentina (1853) and Brazil (1891).5o Many of these countries had
constitutions contemplating some form of judicial review, which
was alien to their civil law tradition, since by then Marbury v.
Madison51 was well enshrined in American constitutional law. The
Brazilian Constitution of 1891 offers an excellent example.
Despite the civil concept of judiciary influenced by the Portuguese
tradition, the new Constitution created a Supreme Court modeled
on the American example with very similar powers.52
The Latin American departure from American
constitutionalism is a reality of the twentieth century. The 1917
Mexican Constitution expands rights and opens the trend to
constitutionalize private law. The lengthy Brazilian Constitution
of 1988 consummates this trend in Latin America. Slowly, many
Latin American countries also adopted the German model of a
specialized constitutional court as part of a package of legal
reforms in transitions: Bolivia (1967); Chile (1980); Guatemala
(1985); Colombia (1991); Peru (1993); and Ecuador (1998). Others
have followed a mitigated model creating a special chamber within
the ordinary Supreme Court: Honduras (1982); El Salvador (1983);
Nicaragua (1987); Costa Rica (amendment of 1989); Paraguay
(1992); and Venezuela (1999). 53
Most Latin American countries today have some form of both
abstract and concrete review of constitutionality, with a variable
degree of open access (recurso de amparo, recurso de tutela,
mandado de seguranqa). These mechanisms are important for
separation of powers and judicial independence, but naturally
contribute to the politicization of the judiciary.54
As compared to the United States, political insularity is still
formally greater in Latin America because the judiciary is usually
more professionalized and regulated by the Supreme Court (e.g.,
when selecting lower court judges or new appointments to the
Supreme Court) or by some local version of weak judicial
United States, 19 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV 323 (2009).
50 See Maria Angela Oliveira, Reforming the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court.- A
Comparative Analysis, 5 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 100 (2006) (recognizing the
obvious American influence in Brazil, although no stare decisis or writ of certiori was
introduced).
51 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
52 See Oliveira, supra note 50.
53 See OQUENDO, supra note 45.
54 Nuno Garoupa, The Politicization of the Kelsenian Constitutional Courts: Empirical
Evidence, in EMPIRICAL JUDICIAL STUDIES (K.C. Huang ed., 2009).
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council.5 Furthermore, the existence of authoritarian political
regimes in the twentieth century has also contributed to the
creation of a distinct judiciary in Latin America. An inoperative
and ineffective judiciary was subordinate to the demands of
national security and military regimes. For example, in Argentina
and Chile where the judiciary was probably stronger, most judges
acknowledged that the security of the state was more important
than the protection of individual rights. Evidently the threat of
depuration in Chile may have convinced those who disagreed, but
the strict vertical hierarchical organization of the judiciary, as
opposed to the horizontal organization developed by judicial
councils in Europe and the loose decentralization of common law
jurisdictions, facilitates the life of a new regime by controlling the
Supreme Court directly.56
In our view the American constitutional influence in Latin
America was much stronger in the appointment mechanisms of the
judiciary, notably of the Supreme Court justices, and less so in the
style of judicial review. This results in a more politicized judiciary,
unknown in the civil law tradition, without the ability to develop
an independent and strong notion of judicial review similar to that
of the U.S. courts.
In summary, strict formalism insulates the judiciary from
political responsibility but also effectively constrains judicial
activism. Such characteristics reduce the need for an open change
against the incumbent judiciary. A pure formalist judiciary will
apply the law with full regard for the interpretation and wishes of
the new legislator, whether democratic or authoritarian. In this
respect, we argue that due to the American constitutional
influence mainly in the nineteenth century, the Latin American
judiciary falls somewhere between the traditional strictness of the
European judiciary and the openly active American judiciary. We
recognize that the Latin American judiciary is probably more
European than American in this respect. However, the structuring
of Supreme Courts (e.g., appointment, judicial review, etc.) that is
similar to the U.S. model has introduced an important degree of
politicization and has hindered the development of a strong "esprit
de corps." Both inevitably undermine the bureaucratic formalism
making Latin America different from the path followed in Europe
throughout the twentieth century.
55 See Fiss, supra note 6; Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 29.
56 See Fiss, supra note 6.
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B. Political and Social Prestige of the Judiciary
Interfering with and replacing a judiciary that has a bad
reputation or is openly politicized is less costly for the new ruling
elite. The cost of challenging the incumbent judiciary is also lower
if they are in a weak position or are less likely to organize strong
opposition.
A judiciary perceived to be politically and economically
corrupt is an easy target. Judicial corruption can provide the
necessary excuse and justification for an intervention. The
notorious existence of bribing and political favoritism can help the
new ruling elite remove disloyal judges. This practice is utilized
much more often in Latin America than in Europe. On the other
hand, a more disorganized incumbent judiciary lacking a strong
"esprit de corps" is less likely to pose strong opposition to change.
As discussed earlier, this occurs more often in Latin America than
in Europe.
The essence of reputation in the Latin American judiciary has
been questionable for a long time.57 Unfortunately, the reforms
imposed by international organizations at the end of the twentieth
century have largely failed to address this problem. The persistent
organizational, administrative, and managerial problems of the
Latin American judiciary have been described in detail in the
literature: financial and political corruption, lack of capacity and
resources, poorly organized courts, weak judicial education and
training, ineffective delivery of justice, utilizing the judiciary as an
arm of the government, and violence against the judiciary.5 8 These
traditional problems require a profound reform of the executive
and legislative powers that have been largely unaddressed. Also,
as expected, the incumbent judiciary is usually hostile to any
implementation of new legal policies. A structural change requires
57 See Steven L. Taylor, Democratization in Latin America, 37 LATIN AM. RES. REV.
162 (2002) (discussing the general belief that judiciaries are the weakest pillar of Latin
America democracies); Michael Dodson, Assessing Judicial Reform in Latin America, 37
LATIN AM. RES. REV. 200 (2002) (recognizing that failed judicial reforms may be easily
explained by the lack of political culture that demands an independent judiciary).
58 See World Bank [WB], Judicial Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean, World
Bank Technical Paper 280 (August 31, 1995); T. Leigh Anenson, For Whom the Bell
Tolls... Judicial Selection By Election in Latin America, 4 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 261
(1997); Luz Estella Nagle, The Cinderella of Government: Judicial Reform in Latin
America, 30 CA. W. INT'L L.J. 345 (2000); see also Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Primacy of
Society and the Failure of Law and Development, in ST. JOHN'S UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW
LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 009-0172 (2009).
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a new judicial culture that influences new law by adding legislation
where there are gaps in the law. However, a new judicial culture is
usually unavailable.59 Importing U.S. models has not worked for
obvious local reasons that are generally ignored by international
organizations.6 °
Narrow judicial reforms based on the view that an American-
inspired judiciary would consolidate democracy have changed little
and, in some cases, have been counter-productive. 6' An unhealthy
judicial organization with a serious deficit of prestige has prevailed
for most of the twentieth century to the present.62
The low quality of the judiciary in Latin America has caught
an immense amount of attention by political scientists. Table 1
summarizes important findings that measure the perceived judicial
performance in Latin America in the early 1990s and more
recently. Many countries have improved judicial performance
probably as a result of more recent extensive reforms, including
Uruguay, Mexico, El Salvador, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Peru,
Honduras, and Ecuador. Many other countries experienced a loss
in quality in recent years, such as Costa Rica, Venezuela,
Argentina, Guatemala, and Nicaragua (the worst performance in
the sample). Nothing has seemingly changed in Colombia,
Panama, or Brazil. The overall performance scores evidence that
the judiciaries of Latin American countries do not possess a
reputation for quality and independence. The general robustness
of these scores further supports our view that the judiciaries of
Latin American countries tend to be weak in terms of their
credibility and legitimacy.
In summary, we argue that the Latin American judiciary is
generally perceived as incompetent, ineffective, politically, and
financially corrupt. It lacks prestige and popularity as a whole.
The reforms advocated by international organizations in the 1980s
and 1990s have largely failed. It is unsurprising that public opinion
is not shocked with open challenges to the incumbent judiciary by
a new political regime that promises substantive improvements in
the court system.
59 See Fiss, supra note 6; PRILLAMAN, supra note 25.
60 See Nagle, supra note 41; see also Jonathan Miller, Judicial Review and
Constitutional Stability: A Sociology of the U.S. Model and Its Collapse in Argentina, 21
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 77 (1997); Enrique A. Sosa Elizeche, Restructuring of
Justice Administration in Paraguay, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1153 (1998).
61 See PRILLAMAN, supra note 25.
62 Id.
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IV. A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL TRANSITIONS
This section is a general overview of political transitions in
Europe and Latin America from the perspective of our thesis. We
also discuss the specific case of Venezuela in the following section.
A. Europe
One of the most violent and despicable political regimes that
existed in Europe was Nazi Germany. Yet the regime, headed by
Adolf Hitler, favored the creation of new courts over court
purging or violence exerted against the judiciary. The new
Weimar Constitution of 1919 enacted after WWI established a
Supreme Court that oversaw the German judiciary. Hitler did not
trust the incumbent judiciary when he came to power in 1933. A
few judges were removed by the Nazi regime but many remained
because the judiciary was perceived as largely irrelevant and
insignificant to the political aims of the new regime.63 That same
judiciary would later apply the racist laws in a formalist way that
supported Hitler's decision to not openly challenge the incumbent
judiciary. Formalism was used as a legal justification for the
incumbent judiciary to collaborate with the construction of the
Third Reich and, after the war, to defend such behavior.'
Inevitably there were occasional shocks between the judiciary
and Hitler's government. When the final outcome of the
Reichstag Fire Trial was determined in 1934, it was disappointing
for the Nazis especially with only one conviction and their
conspiracy theory not proved according to the court. Rather than
purge the regular courts, Hitler decided to create a special court to
deal with political crimes. The Third Reich sponsored a
specialized court model known as the People's Court (VGH) that
was established in 1934. The new court had exclusive control over
matters of treason, resistance, and other political crimes against
the Reich. Above formal constitutional provisions, this court was
neither accountable nor integrated with the regular judiciary. The
People's Court was an effective instrument of the Nazi regime and
completely subservient to the interests of the Third Reich. It was
63 See Marvin E. Frankel, Concerning the Role of the Judiciary May Serve in The
Proper Functioning of a Democracy, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN
AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 23 (Irwin P. Stotzky ed., 1993).
64 See Markus Dirk Dubber, Judicial Positivism and Hitler's Injustice, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1807 (1993).
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dismantled in 1945 in the aftermath of the destruction of the Third
Reich. Curiously, none of the almost 600 judges and state lawyers
that served in the court from 1934 to 1945, not even the last Judge-
President, were convicted of a war crime or made accountable for
their actions while serving on this infamous court.
Another example occurred with the Spanish dictatorship
under Francisco Franco from 1939-1975. Although Franco won a
civil war against the supporters of the former Republic in 1939, the
judicial structure was strongly influenced by the defeated regime.
The new regime developed a parallel system of two court
organizations. One structure included the "regular" court. They
were fairly independent from political interference and self-
contained to non-political issues. Judicial activism was deterred in
areas of political tension or with political implication that affected
the stability of the legitimacy of the Franco regime. The other
court system was organized with a complex set of special bodies
ruling over all matters relevant or important to the political
stability of the ruling elite and the survival of the regime. These
courts were highly controlled, subservient to the regime, and
completely dependent on political aims. In the 1975 transition to
democracy these specialized courts were quickly abolished
whereas little change was effected on the ordinary courts.6 6
The above mentioned policy of a dual system of court
organizations, where one structure is subservient to the dictatorial
regime and the other is a mere continuation of the original courts,
was also implemented in fascist Italy (1922-1943), collaborationist
Vichy France (1940-1944), and authoritarian Portugal (1933-
1974).67
The transitions from military or authoritarian regimes to
democracy in Western Europe generally dealt with the incumbent
judiciary in two ways. First, judicial councils were created to
promote independence and rule of law, thus removing the
65 See generally John B. Mason, The Judicial System of the Nazi Party, 38 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 96 (1948); H. W. KOCH, IN THE NAME OF THE VOLK: POLITICAL JUSTICE IN
HITLER'S GERMANY (I.B. Tauris 1997). The weak denazification of the German courts is
widely documented.
66 Jos6 Juan Toharia, The Organization, Functioning, and Evolution of the Spanish
Judicial System, 1975-2000: A Case Study in Legal Culture, in LEGAL CULTURE IN THE
AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND LATIN EUROPE 377 (Lawrence M.
Friedman & Rogelio P6rez-Perdomo eds., 2003).
67 See generally ALAIN BANCAUD, UNE EXCEPTION ORDINAIRE, LA
MAGISTRATURE EN FRANCE, 1930-1950 (2002); GUIDO NEPPI MODONA, SCIOPERO,
POTERE POLITICO E MAGISTRATURA (1969) (It.).
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influence of politicians from selection, promotion, removal, and
disciplinary action. Such councils vary in composition and
competences but they all favor political insularity at the expense of
accountability.68 Second, the courts directly involved with political
crimes were abolished and new constitutional courts created to
promote judicial review of constitutionality in the context of a
democracy.69 In all cases, including Nazi Germany, the judiciary
was almost entirely unchanged and the judges who served in the
political courts were never prosecuted for human rights violations.
B. Argentina
Argentina had a sequence of strong military and weak
democratic regimes throughout the twentieth century; the
Peronism is likely the most famous one (1946-1955). A new
military dictatorship, headed by General Videla, took over in 1976,
but collapsed in 1983 after the defeat at the Falklands war with
Britain. A political transition to democracy was pursued by
President Alfonsfn (1983-1989), elected by a left-wing coalition,
and was followed by President Menem (1989-1999), sponsored by
the Peronist Party.
The military junta utilized most of the pre-existing legal
institutions and left alone the majority of the lower courts, but
appointed a new Supreme Court that was forced to resign in
1983.70 In fact, the politicization of Supreme Court appointments
and forced resignations dominated Argentina in political transition
as well as in party alternations within democracy. President Carlos
Menem succeeded in an initiative to remake the appointing and
dismissal of judges to serve his own political interests.7 1  In
particular, while President Ratil Alfonsfn had appointed judges to
the Supreme Court who were diverse both in political allegiance
and professional respect (without changing the number of justices
unlike the common practice of all other Presidents), President
Menem pushed a court-backing law through Congress in 1990 that
expanded the Supreme Court from five to nine members, while
managing to fill the new openings with allies that ruled regularly in
68 See Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 29.
69 See Garoupa, supra note 54.
70 See Fiss, supra note 6.
71 GERMAN BURGOS SILVA, ZQug se Entiende hoy por Independencia Judicial?
Algunos Elementos Conceptuales, in 13 INDEPENDENCIA JUDICIAL EN AMERICA
LATINA. ,DE QUItN? ZPARA QUE? ,COMo? ( GermAn Burgos Silva ed., 2003) (Colom.).
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his favor.
7 2
Quite differently, President Ndstor Kirchner (2003-2007)
started a process of Supreme Court reform that included a formal
restriction on the executive's ability to determine justice
appointments.73 Although the new Supreme Court was more
reformist in nature and tried to resolve some of the pending
problems (e.g., lack of transparency of internal proceedings and
limiting the expansion of the court's jurisdiction), it is debatable as
to whether the court was more independent in practice from the
President than before.74
Within Latin America, Argentina is probably the best
example of political transitions purging and manipulating the
Supreme Court as needed to serve political interests, specifically
by adjusting the number of judges to please the ruling President.
The frequency of such episodes has contributed to justices needing
to develop adequate strategies to survive impeding political
transitions.75 This has in turn contributed to decreasing the
reputation of the judiciary and making purging easier.
Traditionally, the Argentine judiciary is politically marginal
whereas the American law judiciary has become the guardian of
the democratic process, personal autonomy of the judiciary, and
the rule of law. The Argentinean judiciary has had the opposite
effect. The Argentinean Supreme Court developed a certain
activism, different from the American tradition that is probably
more adequate for a civil law system. It is evident that the same
Supreme Court model has produced two very different realities in
the U.S. and in Argentina.76
72 Id. See Ruibal, supra note 22.
73 See Ruibal, supra note 22.
74 Id.
75 See Matfas Iaryczower et al., Judicial Independence in Unstable Environments:
Argentina, 1935-1998, 16 AM. J. POL. SCI. 699 (2002); Gretchen Helmke, The Logic of
Strategic Defection: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina under Democracy and
Dictatorship, 96 AM. POL. SCr. REv. 291 (2002); Helmke, Checks and Balances by Other
Means: Strategic Defection and Argentina's Supreme Court in the 1990s, 35 COMP. POL. 213
(2003); HELMKE, COURTS UNDER CONSTRAINTS: JUDGES, GENERALS, AND PRESIDENTS
IN ARGENTINA (2004) [hereinafter COURTS UNDER CONSTRAINTS]; REBECCA BILL
CHAVEZ, THE RULE OF LAW IN NASCENT DEMOCRACIES: JUDICIAL POLITICS IN
ARGENTINA (2004).
76 See Maria In6s Bergoglio, Argentina: The Effects of Democratic Institutionalization,
in LEGAL CULTURE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND LATIN
EUROPE 20 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Rogelio Prez-Perdomo eds., 2003); Carlos S.
Nino, On the Exercise of Judicial Review in Argentina, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN
LATIN AMERICA 309 (Erwin Stotzky ed., 1994).
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Judicial review of administrative acts in Argentina has been
regularly conduced French-style. Democratic periods have been
limited and with weak governments. But in that respect the courts
have developed some degree of activism in order to permit
expansion of executive powers that naturally affect the balance of
power to their own disadvantage.
The low reputation of the Argentine judiciary and the
subservient role of the Supreme Court to the ruling political
regime have made it easy for a new President to remove the
incumbent judiciary. The degree of politicization of the Supreme
Court and deference to the President is expected, therefore
weakening general concerns that undermine the rule of law by
court purging and court packing. More recently, some degree of
judicial activism has been observed as a result of a more
competitive party system, which might express the desire for a
more independent judiciary.77
C. Chile
Democracy has prevailed for most of the twentieth century in
Chile. Constitutional rule was introduced in 1932 after a military
regime. The regime was dominated by a stable party system from
1932 to 1973, although the courts were perceived to be weak.78
President Eduardo Frei Montalva was elected in 1964 for the
Christian-Democrats with a program of moderate reform. His
term in office (1964-1970) did not solve the political tensions
emerging in Chile. President Salvador Allende was elected in
November 1970 as the head of a left-wing coalition with a program
of radical socialist reforms. In 1973 his government was
dramatically staged out of the office by a military coup under
General Pinochet. A military dictatorship ruled from 1973 to
1990, after passing a new Constitution approved by a plebiscite in
1980. A new plebiscite in 1988 opened the route for democracy,
with President Aylwin (1990-1994) and President Eduardo Frei
Ruiz-Tagle (1994-2000).
After the 1973 military coup that eliminated the government
of Salvador Allende in Chile, Pinochet's new regime chose to
77 See, e.g., Rebecca Bill Chbvez, The Appointment and Removal Process for Judges in
Argentina: The Role of Judicial Councils and Impeachment Juries in Promoting Judicial
Independence, 49 LATIN AM POL. & Soc'Y 33 (2007).
78 See Julio Faundez, Chilean Constitutionalism before Allende: Legality Without
Courts, 29 BULL. LATIN AM. RES. (2010).
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promote internal loyal politicization from the top. With a
Supreme Court that was culturally and socially close to the regime
elites, and largely unfavorable to the previous political regime
during the days of the Allende's government, the new military
regime utilized the Supreme Court to impose their will over the
entire judiciary and met minimal disruption. For example, few
incumbent judges were actually purged or disciplined. At the
same time, because the Constitutional Court could not be equally
trusted and was not under direct supervision of the Supreme
Court, Pinochet eliminated the court and further empowered the
incumbent Supreme Court. Court packing increased the total
number of justices from twelve to seventeen.79
There were some minor skirmishes with the Supreme Court in
the initial years of the military regime mainly due to interpretation
of the new rules established by the military under principles and
doctrines developed by the previous regime (the legality of
administrative acts, the recursos de amparo, and the coexistence of
the courts with a separate military justice). This eventually
convinced General Pinochet that a new Constitution was needed
to obliterate previous general principles of law. The goal of the
1980 Constitution was not to start a transition to democracy, but
rather to consolidate the military regime, strategically
constitutionalizing transitory provisions and assuring supremacy of
legal principles dear to the military, thus enshrining the military
tutelage. Its main goal was to solve the internal problems of the
regime. 8°
The case of the Chilean Constitutional Court created in 1981
is particularly relevant. The military regime began by eliminating
the previous Constitutional Court in 1973 because it was too
favorable to the previous regime, unlike the Supreme Court
Justices who were appointed by the same previous regime but
were nevertheless largely sympathetic to Pinochet. Eight years
later, the military dictatorship under Pinochet decided to introduce
the possibility of constitutional review (inaplicabilidad por
inconstitucionalidad) by a special court, at the request of the
President or a fourth of the members of either house. The regime
granted ample powers of review to the court (e.g., draft laws,
79 See Fiss, supra note 6 (discussing that by 1990 fourteen justices were Pinochet's
appointees, two by Allende's, and one was appointed by Eduardo Frei Montalva).
80 See ROBERT BARROS, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DICTATORSHIP: PINOCHET, THE
JUNTA, AND THE 1980 CONSTITUTION (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002).
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decrees, constitutional reforms, and international treaties). The
new court was expected to be largely loyal to the regime.
However, history shows a different record; the court was actually
more independent than anticipated and not completely subservient
to the military regime. In fact, far reaching decisions in 1985
supported the basic standard for free and clean elections in the
1988 plebiscite and later elections that effectively put an end to the
regime itself.81 However, the court was simultaneously docile to
the regime in many other relevant matters.82
The staggering difference between the Chilean Constitutional
Court, appointed by Pinochet but not totally subservient, and the
Supreme Court, largely appointed by left-wing Presidents
(including Allende) before 1973 and yet loyal to Pinochet,
deserves some attention. The explanations are political (including
the complexities of the Chilean democratic system before 1973 and
the absence of party competition after 1973), attitudinal (more
class-based than ideological especially with the upper class
dominance at the bench), and legally formalistic (conservatism and
conformity among the judiciary in the higher courts).8 3  For
example, the introduction of a new judicial council and reforms of
the Supreme Court in the early 1990s were met with opposition,
not for political reasons, but because the elitist behavior of the
judiciary reacted negatively to any outside interference that
delegitimized their social prestige. 84
The general perception during the transition was that the
judiciary was fairly independent, especially the Constitutional
Court. The 1989 constitutional reforms facilitated the work of the
Court by securing a compromise between the military and the
transitional elites.85 However, the members of the Supreme Court
inherited from the military regime, unlike the constitutional
judges, were questioned on their merits and one was impeached
81 See LISA HILBINK, JUDGES BEYOND POLITICS IN DEMOCRACY AND
DICTATORSHIP: LESSONS FROM CHILE (2007) [hereinafter JUDGES BEYOND POLITICS];
Lisa Hilbink, Agents of Anti-Politics: Courts in Pinochet's Chile, in RULE BY LAW: THE
POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 102 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir
Moustafa eds., 2008) [hereinafter Agents of Anti-Politics].
82 See BARROS, supra note 80. The explanation seems to be that institutional stability
demanded a balance between the direct interests of the ruling elite and some operative
concessions to the opposition.
83 Id.
84 See Fiss, supra note 6.
85 See Claudia Heiss & Patricio Navia, You Win Some, You Lose Some: Constitutional
Reforms in Chile's Transition to Democracy, 49 LATIN AM. POL. SOC'Y 163 (2007).
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for shirking his duties. The Supreme Court was an obstacle to the
democratic reforms of Aylwin's government (1990-1994) largely
because of the internal legal culture.86
The underlying legal culture of the Chilean judiciary has been
a priority of all new regimes. The creation of a judicial school by
the military regime failed in 1983. A school was created in 1994 to
promote a changed legal culture that could support the new
innovative democratic regime. 87
The approach to the Supreme Court was largely influenced by
the most traditional formalism in civil law. Rather than opting to
change the court, the new democratic regime favored a new legal
culture based on a formalist approach. The main argument for
favoring a formalist approach was because as long as an incumbent
judiciary is highly professional, uncorrupt, and legally skillful, they
will not be a major problem for the new regime. 88 Another
dominant notion of judicial independence that allows deference to
the government was welcomed by the new democratic political
regime.89 The irony is that the same reasoning was applied by the
previous regime.
D. Peru
A military regime dominated Peru from 1968 to 1980 under
generals Juan Velasco and Francisco Morales Bermiidez. The
return of democracy, after a new Constitution was promulgated in
1979, did not bring political stability and economic growth. After a
term dominated by corruption allegations, the center-left
President Alan Garcfa (1985-1990) was replaced by a center-right
coalition lead by President Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000). The
economic and political instability of the early 1990s and the
problems caused by terrorism culminated in the 1992 Peruvian
constitutional crisis. President Fujimori suspended the separation
of powers and extended presidential powers to interfere with the
86 See Edmundo Fuenzalida Faivovich, Law and Legal Culture in Chile, 1974-1999, in
LEGAL CULTURE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND LATIN
EUROPE 108 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Rogelio P6rez-Perdomo eds., 2003).
87 Id.
88 Unlike the case of Argentina, the Chilean judiciary does not have a reputation for
corruption. See JUDGES BEYOND POLITICS, supra note 81, at 3.
89 Jorge Correa Sutil, The Judiciary and the Political System in Chile: The Dilemmas of
Judicial Independence During the Transition to Democracy, in TRANSITION TO
DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 89 (Irwin P. Stotzky
ed., 1993).
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judiciary (Decree Law 25418). He also inaugurated a more
authoritarian style of government and implemented a new
Constitution, which was promulgated through referendum in 1993.
Corruption and political opposition lead to the collapse of
President Fujimori's government by 2000. A new President,
Alejandro Toledo, ruled over the transition period (2001-2006)
under the 1993 Constitution.
Unlike the transition of the early 1980s, President Fujimori
challenged the incumbent judiciary during his own constitutional
crisis. He fired the Constitutional Court (Tribunal de Garantias
Constitucionales), and many of the higher court judges. 90
President Fujimori undercut the independence of the country's
judges through mass firings and the denial of tenure, as well as
with the passage of laws that circumvented constitutional
provisions aimed at guaranteeing judicial autonomy and restricting
executive power.
The President justified his decision by citing the general
incompetence of the judiciary, the inefficiency of the courts,
corruption, and excessive politicization that occurred as a result of
the traditional party system's decadence that utilized the courts to
fight some political battles. These arguments were also echoed
with the general population. 91  However, even if President
Fujimori justified these policies as efforts to combat corruption
and inefficiency, his success included relying on his own influence
over the courts. The resulting climate of lawlessness facilitated the
corruption for which the former President ultimately faced
criminal charges in the form of human right violations.
The new court system that emerged from the 1993
Constitution intended to tackle these problems. Different judges
were appointed and ratified by the new Constitution for the
purpose of promoting more efficient courts and more effective
justice. Constitutional review was redesigned and the new
Supreme Court was empowered with the competences of the
military courts for terrorism with paramilitary characteristics. 92
President Fujimori's decision to fire the incumbent judges in
1992 generated so much internal and external criticism that the
90 He fired thirteen Supreme Court justices who were members of the Constitutional
Court and both the National and District Judicature Councils.
91 See Fiss, supra note 6.
92 See Fiss, supra note 6; LINN HAMMERGREN, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE AND
JUSTICE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA: THE PERUVIAN CASE IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE (westview Press 1998).
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new regime was forced to effectuate a change. A new court
(Tribunal de Honor de la Magistratura) was created in 1993 to
assess the justifications for serious violations of the rule of law.
E. Brazil
The increasingly leftist leaning of the Brazilian governments
of Presidents Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira (1956-1961), Janio
Quadros (1961), and Joao Goulart (1961-1964) resulted in a
military dictatorship. The military operated initially under
"institutional acts" that provided the constitutional grounds for the
political transition. The military did not initially intend to
dismantle the previous judicial framework. The First Institutional
Act preserved the function of the judiciary, allowing the Brazilian
Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal) to still promote
principles of the Brazilian Constitution of 1946. However, this was
widely distrusted by the new regime because people viewed the
justices as closely related to the outgoing ruling elite. The legal
principles of the old republic, which were established in the
Constitution of 1946, soon became an obstacle to the new political
regime.
In the following years, the military dictatorship used court
packing and court purging in the Supreme Court. Enacted in 1965,
the Second Institutional Act increased the number of justices from
eleven to sixteen, which was reduced to eleven in 1969.13 The new
Constitution enacted in 1967 abolished all judicial privileges,
allowed direct intervention by the military regime into the
judiciary, and was profoundly amended in 1969 to favor the new
regime. In 1967 only six of the sixteen justices that were part of
the Supreme Court composition prior to the military regime were
still part of the court. The Fifth Institutional Act was enacted in
1968 and empowered President Arthur Costa E Silva with a
variety of powers, namely the power to achieve opposition
repression. Under this Act, three justices of the Supreme Court
were removed, which initiated the following resignation of two
other justices. After 1969 the Supreme Court was solely
comprised of justices appointed by the military regime. 94
93 See OSVALDO TRIGUEIRO VALE, 0 STF E A INSTABILIDADE POLITICO-
INSTITUCIONAL (1976) (Braz.).
94 It is important to note that the sixth Justice of the Supreme Court, Ribeiro da Costa,
died in 1967. There seems to be evidence that the Supreme Court responded to political
pressure during the military regime, but other factors may also explain the court decisions.
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A sequence of military Presidents, together with large
interference of the military regime with Supreme Court decision,
followed until 1985. Growing opposition to the military regime
was expressed by electoral defeats of the government supporters in
Brazil's three major states. However, the Supreme Court
continued to be perceived as a strong supporter of the military
regime, or at least as a court that would likely act with deference
towards the executive branch. 95
Serious economic problems culminated with the 1985 election
of the opposing candidate, President Tancredo Neves. A political
transition to democracy started immediately under Presidents Jos6
Sarney (1985-1990) and Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-1992). A
new Constitution was promulgated in 1988 and essentially
maintained the Supreme Court structure. However, the Supreme
Court's competence in constitutional matters was amplified with
the establishment of the injunction relief and the list of authorities
and institutions that could petition for a claim of
unconstitutionality. The 1988 Constitution reinforced many of the
previous functions of the Supreme Court, while also added some
important modifications. The Supreme Court's constitutional role
was enhanced when it was assigned to prosecute and judge the
petitions for unconstitutionality from the different political bodies.
Additionally, other lawsuits were foreseen, such as habeas corpus,
mandado de seguranca, and habeas data.96
The transition to democracy did not directly confront the
incumbent judiciary. 97 The Supreme Court composition was left
largely untouched. 98 A decentralized court system evolved into a
See FABRICIA CRISTINA DE SA SANTOS, DIREITO E AUTORITARISMO: 0 SUPREMO
TRIBUNAL FEDERAL E OS PROCESSOS DE HABEAS-CORPUS ENTRE 1964-1969 (2008)
(Braz.), available at http://www.sapientia.pucsp.br/tde-busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=
8180.
95 See OSCAR VILHENA VIEIRA, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL - JURISPRUDENCIA
POLITICA (2006) (Braz.); ALVARO RICARDO DE SOUZA CRUZ, BREVE HISTORICO DO
SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL E DO CONTROLE DE CONSTITUCIONALIDADE
BRASILEIRO (2004) (Braz.).
96 These are private actions against the President, Congress, and other legislative and
executive branches, including the Supreme Court.
97 Fabiana Luci de Oliveira, 0 Supremo Tribunal Federal no Processo de Transiv'o
Democrdtica: Uma Andlise do Conteatdo dos Jornais Folha de S. Paulo e 0 Estado de
S. Paulo, 22 REVISTA DE SOCIOLOGIA POLiTICA 101 (2004) (Braz.).
98 See Oliveira, supra note 50. The persistent nepotism might have been an excuse to
avoid the more unpopular discussion about empowering the higher courts, since some
states such as Rio Grande do Sul already had state constitutional norms to tackle
nepotism.
628 CARDOZO J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW [Vol. 19:593
more judicially active framework. The persistent nepotism and the
need to harmonize diffused jurisprudence (hence reinforcing the
power of the higher courts) eventually led to the creation of the
judicial council in 2004. 99
In Brazil a judicial council was promoted by the military
regime as a solution to judiciary oversight. Having inherited a
diffused judicial organization and without a trusting relationship
with the Supreme Court, the Brazilian dictatorship created a
judicial council in 1977 to undermine any conflicts between the
new regime and incumbent judges and was composed of seven
Supreme Court justices. The council had national jurisdiction and
was responsible for receiving complaints against members of other
courts as well as taking any necessary remedial measures."
The 1988 Brazilian Constitution abolished this council. It was
largely eliminated because of its relation with the control system
introduced by the dictatorship. In fact, the strategy implemented
by the Brazilian military regime explains why the idea of a judicial
council that secures independence and better management of the
court system was not very popular in democratic Brazil after 1988.
The idea that judicial councils serve to promote new political
goals, rather than to depoliticize, constrained reforms in Brazil.' 0 '
In fact, only in 2004 Brazil inaugurated a new judicial council when
most Latin American countries had already established one as a
response to their own judicial reform packages promoted by
international organizations.
1 0 2
In 2004 the principle of binding decisions (samula vinculante)
was established to address the Supreme Court's incapacity to
influence lower court decisions because stare decisis was absent
from the Brazilian legal system.'03 This principle binds Supreme
Court decisions on the lower courts, an erga omnes effect.
Opponents believe that binding decisions established the
"dictatorship of the Supreme Court," which limits the freedom of
decision of the judges in the lower courts."" Advocates for
99 See Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 29.
100 BRAZILCONST. amend. VII.
101 Eliane Botelho Junqueira, Brazil The Road of Conflict Bound to Total Justice, in
LEGAL CULTURE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND LATIN
EUROPE 64 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Rogelio Prez-Perdomo eds., 2003)
102 See Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 29.
103 BRAZIL CONST. amend. XXXXV.
104 It is of particular importance to understand that the (highly politicized) Supreme
Court influenced the state courts, which were usually populated by career magistrates
(and therefore resembled more civil law courts).
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binding Supreme Court decisions on lower courts further affirm
that this mechanism establishes uniformity in the application of
questions previously answered by other courts, therefore
diminishing the possibility of conflicting decisions among them. 05
These developments corresponded to a general increase in
power for the Brazilian Supreme Court that resulted from the
lengthy 1988 Constitution. However the constitutionalization of
welfare rights preventing rights and principles from being altered
after new elections has inevitably increased the workload of the
court. 106
F. Colombia
The 1886 Colombian Constitution is one of the most stable
Constitutions of Latin America, although it has been amended
several times with important reforms in 1936 and 1968.
Corruption, terrorism, and economic stagnation caused a political
crisis that lead to the creation of a new Constitution in 1991.
There was an important reform of judicial review with the transfer
of competences from the traditional Supreme Court to a new
constitutional court (Tribunal Constitucional).
The reformed competences of the Supreme Court and the
new constitutional court inaugurated a new trend of increased
interventionism in judicial review. °7 The 1991 Constitution aimed
at changing the traditional arrangements. 0 8 Without stare decisis,
the court's ability to conduct judicial review and activism was
limited. 0 9
105 For strong criticism of the former situation, see Augusto Zimmerman, How
Brazilian Judges Undermine the Rule of Law, 11 INT'L TRADE & BUS. L. REV. 179 (2008).
106 See Rogrio B. Arantes, Constitutionalism, the Expansion of Justice and the
Judicialization of Politics in Brazil, in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN
AMERICA (Rachel Sieder et al. eds., 2005); Mariana Mota Prado, Rule of Law Reforms: a
Paradoxical Path to Progress, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 555 (2010). The introduction of new
technologies in the court system has helped the Supreme Court achieve supremacy in
recent years, thus reinforcing the view that promoting politicization from the top is an
effective strategy.
107 Donald T. Fox & Ann Stetson, The 1991 Constitutional Reform: Prospects for
Democracy and the Rule of Law in Colombia, 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L. L. 139 (1992);
Everaldo Lamprea, When Accountability Meets Judicial Independence: A Case Study of the
Colombian Constitutional Courts Nominations, 10 GLOBAL JURIST ADVANCES, Article 7
(2010). For an example on commercial law, see Francisco Reyes Villamizar, Algunas
Vicisitudes del Rggimen Societario Colombiano Derivadas de la Interpretaci6n
Constitucional, 8 CRITtRIO JURiDICO 65 (2008) (Colom.).
108 See Nagle, supra note 41.
109 Id.
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As with other Latin American countries, Colombia imported
the French doctrine of separation of powers but not the American
notion of checks and balances. 1 ' The legal basis for the new
constitutional court was likely the Conseil Constitutionnel or the
Spanish model with limited activism."' The court, however, went
further to protect fundamental rights by monitoring political
branches and extending constitutional principles. Political
conflicts necessarily ensued because of the court's effect on several
important areas of public policy, including the war on drugs and
gender jurisprudence.'12
G. Mexico
The Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) was the sole
political party that dominated Mexico's political life from 1929
until they lost the presidency in 2000. The Mexican Supreme
Court was once controlled by the President, and the Senate, which
was dominated by the PRI, would confirm the presidential
nominations with little control. At the same time, a PRI
dominated Supreme Court spent too much time with circuit and
district appointments rather than resolving cases." 3  Presidents
Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) and Carlos Salinas (1988-1994)
had little trouble with the Court but the increasing congestion,
important economic reforms, and lack of legitimacy convinced
President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) that substantive reform was
needed.
1t 4
President Zedillo introduced far reaching judicial reforms that
empowered the Supreme Court and undermined the traditional
political dependence. The composition of the Mexican Supreme
Court was reduced from twenty-six to eleven justices, the original
110 Id.
11, Id.
112 Id.; Martha I. Morgan, Taking Machismo to Court: The Gender Jurisprudence of the
Colombian Constitutional Court, 30 MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 253 (1998); Rodrigo
Uprimny, The Constitutional Court and Control of Presidential Extraordinary Powers in
Colombia, 10 DEMOCRATIZATION 46 (2003).
113 See ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 44, at 206.
114 See Michael C. Taylor, Why No Rule of Law in Mexico? Explaining the Weakness of
Mexico's Judicial Branch, 27 N.M. L. REV. 141 (1997); Alicia E. Yamin & Maria P.
Noriega Garcia, The Absence of the Rule of Law in Mexico: Diagnosis for and Implications
for a Mexican Transition to Democracy, 21 LOY. LA. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 467 (1999);
Pilar Domingo, Judicial Independence: The Politics of the Supreme Court in Mexico, 32 J.
LATIN AMER. STUD. 705 (2000); Manuel Gonzalez Oropeza, Recent Problems and
Developments on the Rule of Law in Mexico, 40 TEX. INT'L. L.J. 577 (2005).
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number contemplated by the 1917 Constitution. The federal
judiciary was simultaneously reorganized and a judicial council,
known as the Federal Judicial Council, was created to supervise
judicial administration and management, thus alleviating the
pressure over the Supreme Court.
The present prevailing theory for these changes seems to be
that the ruling PRI decided to promote more judicial
independence as a form of securing the maintenance of the status
quo against the loss of power, which took place in 2000 when
President Vincent Fox was elected (2000-2006), followed by
President Felipe Calder6n (since 2006), both from the right-wing
PAN."5 The first direct confrontation between the Mexican
Supreme Court with the ruling PRI occurred in 1998 on a state
electoral law.116 The second major judicial challenge was against
President Fox in 2001 on a dispute he had with the PRD mayor (a
left-wing party) of the capital city." 7 The court unanimously ruled
against the President and further rulings against the President
began to follow.
Although the 1994 reforms were largely perceived as
enhancing judicial independence, President Zedillo effectively
forced the retirement of all twenty-one of the old PRI appointed
justices and selected eleven new justices to take over in 1995.118
President Zedillo's court packing strategy was not perceived as an
attack against the rule of law given the low reputation and lack of
credibility of the incumbent judiciary.
At the same time, the PAN Presidents inherited a Supreme
Court largely dominated by PRI appointees and they did not have
many opportunities to engage in an open strategy to challenge the
Mexican Supreme Court. To begin with, after the 1994 reforms
the reputation for judicial independence was enhanced therefore
raising the costs for any open challenge. Second, PAN's lack of
control over the Senate potentially limited their ability to
effectively condition the Court.
President Zedillo lost control of the lower house in 1997 and
President Fox was unable to regain control over the lower house.
Additionally, the PRI and PRD opposition have dominated the
Senate. In fact, it is likely that the fragmentation of political
115 See Finkel, supra note 20.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 See ZAMORA ET AL., supra note 44, at 206.
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power in Mexico has permitted the development of a more
independent federal judiciary, which has in turn undermined the
possibility of direct interference during the transition from PRI to
PAN presidencies.119 Similar results are observable at the state
level. 120
V. THE SPECIFIC CASE OF VENEZUELA
We now discuss the particular case of Venezuela, which serves
as a nearly perfect example of the different forms of political
interventionism described thus far. We study the recent removal
of judges from the second most important court of the country, the
refusal of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (Tribunal Supremo de
Justicia) to obey the ruling of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights because of a purported contradiction with the 1999
Venezuelan Constitution, 121 and the latest reform of the judicial
system that attempts to diminish the judiciary's independence.
Upon his 1998 election to the formerly known Republic of
Venezuela, President Chdvez implemented a personal policy to
find a loyal judiciary. Our arguments are apparent from our
theory. The incumbent Venezuelan judiciary was potentially too
disloyal to the ideology of the new political regime. In addition,
the reputation of the judges in general, and the justices in
particular, was at best questionable. As emphasized later,
President Chdivez was in a very convenient position to successfully
strategize an intervention without expecting too much opposition
from the bench.
Some background information is required to best understand
the Venezuelan transitional period from the "Fourth Republic" to
the "Socialism" of the twenty-first century. From a historical and
constitutional perspective, the Venezuelan judiciary never enjoyed
as much power as the executive or legislative.1 12 To make matters
worse the judiciary was frequently criticized of corruption and the
common perception was that the judges did not have an interest in
changing the system to enforce justice because they were the main
119 See Julio Rios-Figueroa, Fragmentation of Power and the Emergence of an Effective
Judiciary in Mexico, 1994-2002, 49 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC'Y 31 (2007).
120 Caroline C. Beer, Judicial Performance and the Rule of Law in the Mexican States, 48
LATIN AM. POL. & SOC'Y 33 (2006).
121 CONST. OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA No. 5.453 of Mar. 24,
2000.
122 See Venezuela 1958-1999, supra note 4, at 424.
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beneficiaries of the system's corrupt practices. 123  Rather than
confronting the judiciary directly, President Chivez recommended
that the National Constituent Assembly, which was formed to
draft a new Constitution, act accordingly. As a result, one of the
first acts of the National Constituent Assembly was to declare an
emergency concerning judiciary reform. 124 The Assembly
suspended the tenure of all judges and created an emergency
commission that was empowered to reorganize the entire judicial
system. On October 14, 1999, in an attempt to adhere to the new
political regime, the Supreme Court of Justice (en banc) justified
the original power of the Constituent Assembly with an expansive
argument about the constitutionality of a Decree of Emergency
and volunteered to "collaborate" during the transitory period.
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court dissented and, as a result,
resigned.
1 25
Once the Constitution was approved by referendum in
December 1999, the organization and management of the judiciary
was granted to the new Supreme Tribunal of Justice, which
replaced the old Supreme Court of Justice. 126  Contrary to the
original spirit of the Constitution, in 1999 the Commission on the
Functioning and Restructuring of the Judicial System (CFRJS)
was temporarily formed to oversee judicial discipline. It has been
continuously exercising this disciplinary judicial jurisdiction
without a legally sound justification. 2 7 However, this legal rarity
only scratches the surface of the Venezuelan judiciary's lack of
independence problem. As discussed next, Venezuela is currently
pursuing both a court packing scheme, similar to that of Menem,
and an assault on judicial independence, similar in spirit (if not in
scope) to that of Fujimori.
128
123 Id. at 451.
124 Decree of Reorganization of the Judicial Power, Decree No. 3 of Feb. 2, 1999,
Gaceta Oficial N' 36.634 of Feb. 2, 1999 (Venez.).
125 Right after the decision was published, Former President of the Supreme Court of
Venezuela, Cecilia Sosa G6mez, resigned and stated the following in a press conference,
"The court simply committed suicide to avoid being assassinated. But the result is the
same. It is dead." Americas Top Venezuelan Judge Resigns, BBC NEWs, Aug. 25, 1999,
available at http://cdnedge.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/429304.stm.
126 Up to that moment, such a power was shared by the Supreme Court of Justice and
the Judicial Council. CONST. OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA art. 217
(1961).
127 JES3S MARIA CASAL, Los DERECHOS HUMANOS Y SU PROTECCION (2008)
(Venez.).
128 See discussion supra Part IV.
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A. Political Transition, Interventionism and Judicial Power
Prior to 1999, Congress appointed the Supreme Court Justices
for a nine year period and replaced one third of them every three
years. 2 9  The appointments were based solely on political
considerations and the judiciary was therefore frequently criticized
of corruption. 3 The 1999 Constitution took a great step towards
the formal independence of judicial power.' 3' Article 264 of the
1999 Constitution sets rules for the judicial selection process,
providing some fairness and transparency to the procedure by
stating the following:
The justices of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice shall be elected
for a single term of 12 years. The election procedure shall be
determined by law. In all cases, candidates may be proposed to
the Judicial Nominations Committee either on their own
initiative or by organizations involved in the field of law. After
hearing the opinion of the community, the Committee shall
carry out a pre-selection to be submitted to the Citizen Power,
which shall carry out a second pre-selection to be submitted to
the National Assembly, which shall carry out the final selection.
Citizens may file objections to any of the candidates, for cause,
with the Judicial Nominations Committee or the National
Assembly.
These rules formally guaranteed some degree of fairness and
independence in the appointment process and represented an
important step forward from previous constitutional arrangements.
Notwithstanding the efforts toward judicial independence, we
maintain that since 1999 the judicial power has travelled a
transitory path producing a great deal of illegalities and political
arbitrariness at the expense of contravening the rule of law and
independent judicial power.
The court packing process in Venezuela began in 2004 when
the National Assembly passed the Organic Law of the Supreme
Tribunal of Justice (OLSTJ), 1 32 which expanded the court's size
from twenty to thirty-two members. Consequently, a majority of
the ruling coalition, members and allies of President Chivez' Fifth
Republic Movement (Movimiento V Repablica, or MVR), named
129 Rogelio P6rez-Perdomo, The Judicialization and Regime Transformation: the
Venezuelan Supreme Court, in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA
315 (Rachel Sieder et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter Regime Transformation].
130 Venezuela 1958-1999, supra note 4, at 451.
131 See Regime Transformation, supra note 129, at 135.
132 Decree of May 20, 2004, Gaceta Oficial N' 37.942 of May 20, 20(04 (Venez.).
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justices to fill the twelve new seats in the Supreme Tribunal. Five
more Justices were additionally named later to fill vacancies that
opened in recent months, and thirty-two more were named as
reserve justices. This resulted in the head of the executive power,
by means of his ruling coalition in the legislative branch,
effectively securing a loyal majority in the Tribunal.
In terms of purging and court packing, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights stated in its August 5, 2008, ruling that the
court packing neither constituted an undue interference of the
executive and legislative branch into the autonomy of the judicial
power, nor was it ideologically purged. 133 We disagree with this
statement for two reasons. First, the new OLSTJ is likely to have
violated Article 265 of the 1999 Constitution which specifically
seeks to guarantee the independence of Supreme Tribunal justices
by establishing an impeachment process that requires justice
removal with a two-thirds majority vote by Congress and only for
"serious offenses." The OLSTJ granted the governing coalition in
the National Assembly the power to remove judges from the
Court without the required super majority vote.
Second, the Supreme Tribunal, which has administrative
control over the judiciary, has failed to secure tenure for eighty
percent of the country's judges.'34 We closely examine a notorious
case that involved the dismissal of three judges from the First
Administrative Court (Corte Primera de lo Contencioso
Administrativo (CPCA)) in October 2003.
B. The Specific Case of the Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights v. Venezuela before the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights
The CPCA is the second highest court in Venezuela and has
national jurisdiction over the legality of administrative acts of the
government (municipal and federal authorities), as well as over
claims involving minor charges against the republic, autonomous
institutions, and state business. 35 It was created by the Organic
Law of the Supreme Court of Justice of 1976136 to decentralize and
increase the efficiency of the chamber of the Supreme Court of
133 Apitz Barbera et al. v. Venezula, Case 182, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., No. 08-1572 (2008).
134 CASAL, supra note 127.
135 Regime Transformation, supra note 129, at 145.
136 Ley Orginica de la Corte Suprema de Justicia. Gaceta Oficial N' 1.893
Extraordinary of July 30, 1976 (Venez).
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Justice which specialized in administrative matters (Sala Politico-
Administrativa) '37
In the year prior to their dismissal, the CPCA judges granted
numerous appeals challenging many policies and programs of the
Chdvez government. The most notorious challenge 138 was issued
on August 21, 2003, when the majority of the CPCA (three of the
five judges) held that hundreds of Cuban doctors sent by the
Cuban government to work as volunteers in poor communities
could not practice medicine in Venezuela without Venezuelan
medical associate certification (Plan Barrio Adentro).' 39  Three
days after the Plan Barrio Adentro ruling was issued, President
Chdivez publicly denounced the CPCA and referred to them as
"judges who should not be judges."'40 He further stated, "I am not
telling them what I would like to do because we are in front of the
country... Do you think the Venezuelan people are going to pay
attention to an unconstitutional decision? Well they're not going
to pay attention to it!"'' Other members of government
countered the President by inviting the people to disrespect his
denunciation and follow the CPCA's decision (e.g., Minister of
Health,142 Mayor of Liberator Municipality,'4 3 and the Mayor of
Sucre Municipality in Caracas'44).
In the following days the Inspector General of the judiciary
submitted a recommendation to the CRFPJ that the five CPCA
judges be dismissed because of an entirely unrelated issue, a
Supreme Court determination made the previous May that the
CPCA had committed an "inexcusable error" in a 2002
unanimously rendered. After reviewing the charge and the judges'
defenses, the Commission ordered the dismissal of four of the
judges.145 The judges that dissented in the Plan Barrio Adentro
137 Regime Transformation, supra note 129, at 145.
138 In total, there are eleven CPCA decisions that would constitute the reason for the
Destitution, ten of them issued between August 2002 and August 2003. In those decisions,
the CPCA was accused of ruling against the "Revolutionary Process."
139 CPCA, Sentence No. 2727 of August 21, 2003. Corte Venezuela ordena dejar de
ejercer mdicos Cuba en Caracas, REUTERS, August 21, 2003.
140 Alo Presidente No. 161 of August 24, 2003.
141 Id.
142 Gobierno desconoce la decisi6n judicial de reemplazar a los mdicos cubanos, EL
NACIONAL, available at http://www.elnacional.com.do/ (Venez.).
143 Ni en suehos se suspende el plan Barrio Adentro, EL UNIVERSAL, August 28, 2003
(Venez.).
144 Los cuestionamientos de Jos6 Vicente y Freddy Bernal, EL UNIVERSAL (Venez.).
145 OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA, Nov. 4,2003.
The fifth judge, Judge Marrero, had already retired and was therefore not subject to
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case, thus favoring the government's position, were both later
appointed to the Supreme Tribunal of Justice. 146
Three of the judges, the majority of the CPCA, appealed the
decision to the Supreme Tribunal. However, the Tribunal failed to
deliver a decision on the matter after eighteen months and the
three judges were forced to plead that the state of Venezuela
presumptively violated their rights to the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights.
On August 2, 2008, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights unanimously ruled that Venezuela violated the rights of the
three CPCA judges to: (1) a fair trial by an independent court; 147
(2) a hearing by an impartial court; 14 8 (3) a reasonable time period
in which to be heard;149 and (4) simple, prompt, and effective
recourse in a competent court for the protection of one's rights. 150
Moreover, the Inter-American Court ordered the three judges to
be reinstated within six months from notice of the judgment, if
they so desired, to a position in the judiciary with the same salary,
related benefits, and equivalent rank as they possessed prior to
their removal from office.
The Court also ordered the state of Venezuelan to adopt
measures required to pass the Venezuelan Code of Judicial Ethics
within one year of its ruling. Despite this decision of the Inter-
American Court, on December 18, 2008151 the constitutional
chamber of the Supreme Tribunal declared the Inter-American
Court's ruling to be "of impossible execution"' 5 2  within
Venezuelan territory because of its conflict with provisions
Venezuela's 1999 Constitution. The Tribunal further interpreted
Article 23 of the 1999 Constitution (previously cited above) to
refer exclusively to those provisions that create "rights," not to
rulings or resolutions issued by international courts. 153
Furthermore, the TSJ clearly indicated that these disputed court
rulings and resolutions are applicable within Venezuelan territory
sanction.
146 Justices Marrero and Morales, who was one of the four judges dismissed.
147 American Convention on Human Rights, art. VIII, 11, July 18, 1978, O.A.S. Treaty
Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
148 See id. View in relation to the general obligations set forth in art. 1, $ 1 & art. 2.
149 Id.
150 Compare id. art. XXV, 11 with id. art. 1,91 1.
151 Apitz Barbera et al. v. Venezula, Case 182, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., No. 08-1572 (2008).
152 In Spanish the term is "inejecutable".
153 Apitz Barbera et al. v. Venezula, Case 182, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., No. 08-1572 (2008)
(at the constitutional chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice).
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"if and only if they do not contradict the 1999 Constitution,
regardless of their nature." 154
This is not the first time a domestic Supreme Court decided
not to follow a ruling of the Inter-American Court. The
Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal Court cited the Peruvian case of
May 30, 1999, where the Supreme Military Council of Justice
declared the Inter-American ruling on the case Castillo Petruzzi
and others "of impossible execution." Similar to the Venezuelan
case, the Court reasoned that the inexistence of a "supranational
jurisdiction" justified this aim.
The Supreme Tribunal constitutional chamber potentially
ruled incorrectly on at least two other issues. First, it called for the
executive to denounce the Inter-American Convention. As the
dissenting opinion of Justice Rond6n Haaz stated, the problem
was that the applicability of the Convention was never an issue in
this case and the Tribunal therefore exceeded the scope of the
controversy. Moreover, this decision constituted an improper
interference with executive powers and violated Article 236 of
Venezuela's 1999 Constitution, which states that the President of
the Republic has attribution power and the duty "[t]o direct the
international relations of the Republic and sign and ratify
International treaties, agreements or conventions."
Second, the Tribunal urged the National Assembly to pass the
Judicial Code of Ethics within the term previously ordered by the
Decision No. 1048 of May 18, 2006. However, once the time
period for compliance with the court elapsed the National
Assembly was held in contempt of court. The Court incorrectly
issued a new order for the National Assembly to comply with this
duty, while the procedure that should have been executed is that
for those institutions held in contempt of court.
C. Latest Reforms of the Judiciary
As we stated earlier, another manner of interventionism
occurs through enactment of new laws to restrain judges from
interfering with the new political regime. Numeral five of the
fourth temporary provision of the Venezuelan Constitution
mandated the National Assembly to approve legislation relating to
the judicial branch within one year upon its installation. After a
ten year delay, following the procedure set forth in Article 203 of
154 Id.
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the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution'55 for an organic law to be
passed, on October 15, 2008 the Project of the Organic Law of the
Justice System (OLJS) was approved on first discussion. This law
regulates the organization, coordination, and operation of the
judicial power.
According to Article 253 of the 1999 Venezuelan
Constitution, the judicial branch consists of:
[T]he Supreme Tribunal of Justice, such other courts as may be
determined by law, the Office of Public Prosecutions, the
Public Defender's Office, criminal investigation organs, judicial
assistants and officials, the penitentiary system, alternative
means of justice, citizens participating in the administration of
justice in accordance with law and attorneys at law admitted to
practice.
As established by Article 62 of the 1999 Venezuelan
Constitution, the project of law was presented for comments by
several institutions of the government. This paper examines the
particular comments issued by the office of the Chief Prosecutor,
which considers that some provisions in the OIUS
unconstitutional. On March 10, 2009, the National Assembly
approved seventeen articles of the OLJS. Among these approved
articles the most controversial provisions created a National
Committee of the Judicial System (Article 9), which also granted
authority to plan and coordinate the policies and plans of the
entire court system.
156
The committee, comprised of eight members, would be
composed of two congresspersons of the National Assembly, two
justices of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (including the Chief
Justice), two ministers representing the Executive branch, the
Fiscal General (Chief Prosecutor), the Defensor del Pueblo
(Ombudsman), the general public defender, the Procurador
(Lawyer of the Nation), and a congressperson representing the
indigenous communities.
155 Article 203 reads:
Organic laws are those designated as such by this Constitution, those enacted
to organize public powers or developing constitutional rights, and those which
serve as a normative framework for other laws. Any bill for the enactment of
an organic law, except in the case of those defined as such in the Constitution
itself, must first be accepted by the National Assembly, by a two thirds vote of
the members present, before the beginning of debate on the bill. This
qualifying vote shall also apply to the process of amending organic acts.
CONST. OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA art. 203.
156 CONST. OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA art. 9.
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Part of the powers of this Commission have already been
approved in the second debate so it will be a matter of time before
the law is promulgated and executed by the President of
Venezuela. The main powers of the Commission include
coordination of the policies and plans of the justice system,
evaluation of the budgets of the judiciary, and examination of the
members of the system. The Commission will be empowered to
evaluate judicial performance. The decisions of the Commission
will be determined by simple majority. In other words, because
the judiciary only has five votes, a decision concerning the judicial
system will most likely be determined by representatives of other
branches of power.
On November 6, 2008 the Chief Prosecutor sent comments on
the OLJS to the legislature proclaiming his belief that it was
unconstitutional. It stated that the Commission set forth in the
OLJS would be conceived as a superior entity that oversaw the
rest of the institutions of the judicial system, "something like a
government of the legal system," to direct a great deal of the acts,
policies, budgeting, and training of its officers. The report also
rejected the fact that seven of the twelve members of the
Commission would not be members of the judiciary. It also
challenges the power of the Commission to coordinate the budget
because, under the respective constitutional provisions, each part
of the Venezuelan judicial system is granted with functional,
economic, and administrative autonomy. The comments further
noted that even though Article 136 of the 1999 Venezuelan
Constitution provides that the members of all constitutional
branches of power shall collaborate in furtherance of the interest
of the country, Article 5 of the project includes concepts such as
integration, coordination, and joint responsibility that may be
interpreted as an intervention of the judiciary's autonomy and
independence. Discussion and approval of the rest of the body of
this law is still ongoing.
D. Our Model and the (Difficult) Case of Venezuela
We have detailed how the new political regime created by
President Chdivez in Venezuela has dealt with the incumbent
judiciary. The reasoning behind the strategic choices made by
President Chdvez is justified within our model. Unlike many
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previous cases studied in this field,157 our specific example of
Venezuela describes a transition from democracy to a more
authoritarian regime, even if it is considered quasi-democratic in
nature. In that sense, our example provides a more ambitious
challenge to our model. Therefore, our argument is enhanced by
the fact that our model provides a useful framework to understand
the decisions of President Chdivez.
The Venezuelan judiciary was not traditionally active in the
American sense, constituting a weak subordinated branch of
government with judges playing a minor role in the institutional
arrangements of the country. 5 8 The appointment of judges and
administration of the court system has been on the hands of
Venezuelan politicians under the model of the 1961 Venezuelan
Constitution. From 1958 to 1998 the judicial apparatus was
minimal and overwhelmingly focused on criminal prosecution and
litigation of employment law. 159 Nevertheless, there were some
tenuous signs that the judiciary was increasingly less passive from
1992 to 1999.160
To a certain extent Venezuelan politicians were aware of the
precarious situation of their judiciary prior to 1999. Under the
1961 Constitution, in order to guarantee an independent Supreme
Court, justice terms were set at nine years with an option for
reappointment. The Congress renewed the court by thirds every
three years. A judicial council was created and a law on the
judicial career developed in 1980 to regulate evaluation and
judicial sanctions.161 It is argued that these complex arrangements
failed to shield the judiciary from corruption and networks of
interests patronized by party clienteles that divided judicial
appointments.162
The 1999 political struggle was initiated by disputes over the
control of the court system, specifically the Venezuelan Supreme
Court, to advance particular ideological agendas. In anticipation
of a potentially more active judiciary, and while also avoiding the
capture of the judiciary by the opposition, President Chdivez opted
for more direct forms of interventionism. The lack of
157 See Agents of Anti-Politics, supra note 81; COURTS UNDER CONSTRAINTS, supra
note 75; CHAVEZ, supra note 75.
158 See Venezuela 1958-1999, supra note 4; Regime Transformation, supra note 129.
159 See Venezuela 1958-1999, supra note 4.
160 See Regime Transformation, supra note 129.
161 See Venezuela 1958-1999, supra note 3.
162 Id.
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independence and potential political subordination to the
opposition of the Supreme Court, specifically the constitutional
chamber (Sala Constitucional), diminished the traditional pure
formalism of civil law higher courts. This situation is easily framed
within our first argument of our proposed model.
At the same time, as underlined by our second argument,
President Chdivez faced an incumbent judiciary with weak political
and social prestige. The incumbent judiciary was perceived to be
prone to political manipulation during the previous regime and
therefore the product of a clientelism approach to judicial
appointments. They were seen as significantly corrupt, largely
ineffective, and unpopular. The incumbent judiciary was not in a
position to seriously challenge the will of the new regime. 163 The
powerless judiciary allowed President Chdivez to actually interfere
and hamper with the incumbent judiciary while simultaneously
committing to the principles of an independent judiciary, even
while improving the de jure legal framework that the Venezuelan
judiciary operates under.
According to our model if the incumbent judiciary had been
more prestigious or less prone to political favors (i.e., more
formalist), President Chdivez would not likely have openly and
actively engaged in shaping the new judiciary as he did. The two
conditions we identified in our model, weak forms of formalism
and lack of prestige, are easily verified in the Venezuelan case in
1999. These conditions allowed the strategic choices of President
ChAvez to flourish with little opposition.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our paper proposed a theory of how political transitions
address incumbent judiciaries. We argued that a new political
regime inevitably compares the benefit of reshaping the judiciary
with loyal appointees against the political and economic costs of
directly interfering, including the cost of international reputation.
There are several forms of interventionism including soft control,
explicit court packing, court purging, and violence against the
judiciary. Softer forms of interventionism are cheaper but less
effective, while stronger forms are more effective but expensive.
Depending on local conditions and significant political constraints,
a new political regime may opt for a mix of soft and hard
163 See Regime Transformation, supra note 129.
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mechanisms of intervening.
We discussed the political transitions in the civil law
jurisdictions of Europe and Latin America from the perspective of
our theory. We observed that softer forms of interventionism tend
to prevail in Europe while stronger forms more frequently occur in
Latin America. We proposed the confluence of two factors: Latin
American judiciaries are both less reputable and organized than
those in Europe, and, therefore, the nature of Latin American
judiciaries reduces the cost of stronger incumbent interference for
new political regimes. The influence of American
constitutionalism in Latin America has reduced strict formalism
and created a judiciary that is still less activist than the U.S.
judiciary, but is significantly more politicized than in Europe. This
effect makes the need for a direct intervention more acute.
Our theory applies equally to transitions from military
dictatorships to democracy and from weak democracies to
authoritarian regimes. We discussed several examples in light of
our theory and focused on the recent case of Venezuela. We
argued that had the incumbent judiciary in Venezuela been more
prestigious or less prone to political favors (i.e., more formalistic),
President Chivez would not likely have openly and actively
engaged in shaping the new judiciary as he did. The two
conditions we identified in our model, weaker forms of formalism
and lack of prestige, were easily verified in the Venezuelan case in
1999 and explain President Chdivez' successful strategic choices of
interventionism.
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Judicial Performance Scores for Latin America 64
Country Judicial Performance Judicial Performance
(2002-2003) (1992-1993)
Uruguay 2.73 2.87
Costa Rica 2.90 2.66
Mexico 3.51 4.35
Chile 3.57 3.98













Range of index: 1 (best) to 6 (worst).
164 Joseph L. Staats et al., Measuring Judicial Performance in Latin America, 47 Latin
Am. Pol. & Soc'y 77, 90 (2005).
